Concept: Sorie Ibrahim Koroma
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic that hit West Africa in 2013 was the worst outbreak of EVD in recorded history. While much has been published regarding the international and national-level EVD responses, there is a dearth of literature on district-level coordination and operational structures, successes, and failures. This article seeks to understand how the EVD response unfolded at the district level, namely the challenges to operationalizing EVD surveillance over the course of the outbreak in Port Loko and Kambia districts of Sierra Leone. We present here GOAL Global’s understanding of the fundamental challenges to case investigation operations during the EVD response, including environmental and infrastructural, sociocultural, and political and organizational challenges, with insight complemented by a survey of 42 case investigators. Major challenges included deficiencies in transportation and communication resources, low morale and fatigue among case investigators, mismanagement of data, mistrust among communities, and leadership challenges. Without addressing these operational challenges, technical surveillance solutions are difficult to implement and hold limited relevance, due to the poor quality and quantity of data being collected. The low prioritization of operational needs came at a high cost. To mediate this, GOAL addressed these operational challenges by acquiring critical transportation and communication resources to facilitate case investigation, including vehicles, boats, fuel, drivers, phones, and closed user groups; addressing fatigue and low morale by hiring more case investigators, making timely payments, arranging for time off, and providing meals and personal protective equipment; improving data tracking efforts through standard operating procedures, training, and mentorship to build higher-quality case histories and make it easier to access information; strengthening trust in communities by ensuring familiarity and consistency of case investigators; and improving operational leadership challenges through meetings and regular coordination, establishing an active surveillance strategy in Port Loko, and conducting an after-action review. Resolving or addressing these challenges was of primary importance, and requisite for the implementation of technical epidemiological complements to EVD case investigation.
Case-fatality rates in Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) varied widely during the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa. We assessed the influence of referral pathway on ETC case-fatality rates with a retrospective cohort of 126 patients treated at the Mathaska ETC in Port Loko, Sierra Leone. The patients consisted of persons who had confirmed EVD when transferred to the ETC or who had been diagnosed onsite. The case-fatality rate for transferred patients was 46% versus 67% for patients diagnosed onsite (p = 0.02). The difference was mediated by Ebola viral load at diagnosis, suggesting a survival selection bias. Comparisons of case-fatality rates across ETCs and clinical management strategies should account for potential survival selection bias.
BACKGROUND: Since 2007 Sierra Leone has conducted mass drug administration (MDA) for the elimination of lymphatic filariasis (LF) implemented by unpaid community health volunteers (CHVs). Other health campaigns such as Mother and Child Health Weeks (MCHW) pay for services to be implemented at community level and these persons are then known as community health workers (CHWs). In 2010, the LF MDA in the 12 districts of the Southern, Northern and Eastern Provinces un-expectantly coincided with universal distribution of Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LLITNs) during the MCHW. In-process monitoring of LF MDA was performed to ensure effective coverage was attained in hard to reach sites (HTR) in both urban and rural locations where vulnerable populations reside. METHODS: Independent monitors interviewed individuals eligible for LF MDA and tallied those who recalled having taken ivermectin and albendazole, calculated program coverage and reported results daily by phone. Monitoring of coverage in HTR sites in the 4 most rapidly urbanizing towns was performed after 4 weeks of LF MDA and again after 8 weeks throughout all 12 districts. End process monitoring was performed in randomly selected HTR sites not previously sampled throughout all 12 districts and compared to coverage calculated from the pre-MDA census and reported treatments. RESULTS: Only one town had reached effective program coverage (>=80%) after 4 weeks following which CHWs were recruited for LF MDA in all district headquarter towns. After 8 weeks only 4 of 12 districts had reached effective coverage so LF MDA was extended for a further month in all districts. By 12 weeks effective program coverage had been reached in all districts except Port Loko and there was no significant difference between those interviewed in communities versus households or by sex. Effective epidemiological coverage (>=65%) was reported in all districts and overall was significantly higher in males versus females. CONCLUSIONS: The challenges to LF MDA included the late delivery in country of ivermectin, the availability and motivation of unpaid CHVs, concurrent LLITN distribution and the MCHW, remuneration for CHWs, rapid urbanization and employment seeking population migrations. ‘In process’ monitoring ensured modifications of LF MDA were made in a timely manner to ensure effective coverage was finally attained even in HTR locations.